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Quantum Bayesianism at the Perimeter
by Christopher A. Fuchs
ABSTRACT
The author summarizes the Quantum Bayesian [1–7] viewpoint
of quantum mechanics, developed originally by C. M. Caves,
R. Schack, and himself. It is a view crucially dependent upon
the tools of quantum information theory. Work at Perimeter
Institute continues the development and is focussed on the hard
technical problem of a finding a good representation of quantum
mechanics purely in terms of probabilities, without amplitudes
or Hilbert-space operators. The best candidate representation
involves a mysterious entity called a symmetric informationally
complete quantum measurement. Contemplation of it gives
a way of thinking of the Born Rule as an addition to the
rules of probability theory, applicable when one gambles on
the consequences of interactions with physical systems. The
article ends by outlining some directions for future work.1
A FEARED DISEASE
In these days of unceasing media coverage for the H1N1
pandemic, we are reminded that a healthy body can be
stricken with a fatal disease that to outward appearances
is nearly identical to a common yearly annoyance: sim-
ple seasonal flu. There are lessons here for quantum me-
chanics. In the history of physics, there has never been a
healthier body than quantum theory; no theory has ever
been more all-encompassing or more powerful. Its calcu-
lations are relevant at every scale of physical experience,
from subnuclear particles, to table-top lasers, to the cores
of neutron stars and even the first three minutes of the uni-
verse. Yet, since its founding days, many physicists have
feared that quantum theory’s continuing annoyance—the
unease that something at the bottom of the theory does
not make sense—may one day turn fatal itself.
There is something about quantum theory that is different
in character from any physical theory posed before. To put
a finger on it, the issue is this: The basic statement of the
theory—the one we have all learned from our textbooks—
seems to rely on terms our intuitions balk at as having
1This article is an extract from a longer one titled, “. . . And the
Perimeter of Quantum Bayesianism.” Beside expanding on all the
points here, it gives a Quantum Bayesian answer to the crucial
question “If quantum states are not part of the stuff of the world,
then what is?” See Ref. [1].
any place in a fundamental description of reality. The
notions of “observer” and “measurement” are taken as
primitive, the very starting point of the theory. This is an
unsettling situation! Shouldn’t physics be talking about
what is before it starts talking about what will be seen
and who will see it? Perhaps no one has put the point
more forcefully than John Stewart Bell [8]:
What exactly qualifies some physical systems to play the
role of ‘measurer’? Was the wavefunction of the world
waiting to jump for thousands of millions of years until a
single-celled living creature appeared? Or did it have to
wait a little longer, for some better qualified system . . .
with a PhD?
One sometimes gets the feeling that until this issue is
settled, fundamental physical theory has no right to move
on. Worse yet, that to the extent it does move on, it does
so only as the carrier of something insidious, something
that will eventually cause the whole organism to stop in
its tracks. “Dark matter and dark energy? Might these
be the first symptoms of a something systemic? Might the
problem be much deeper than getting our quantum fields
wrong?” — This is the kind of fear at work here.
So the field of quantum foundations is not unfounded; it
is absolutely vital to physics as a whole. But what con-
stitutes “progress” in quantum foundations? Throughout
the years, it seems the most popular criterion has derived
from the tenor of Bell’s quote: One should remove the
observer from the theory just as quickly as possible. In
practice this has generally meant to keep the mathemat-
ical structure of quantum theory as it stands (complex
Hilbert spaces, etc.), but find a way to tell a story about
the mathematical symbols that involves no observers.
Three examples suffice to give a feel: In the de Broglie –
Bohm “pilot wave” version of quantum theory, there are no
fundamental measurements, only “particles” flying around
in a 3N -dimensional configuration space, pushed around
by a wave function regarded as a physical field. In “sponta-
neous collapse” versions, systems are endowed with quan-
tum states that generally evolve unitarily, but from time-
to-time collapse without any need for measurement. In Ev-
erettian or “many-worlds” quantum mechanics, it is only
the world as a whole—they call it a multiverse—that is re-
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ally endowed with an intrinsic quantum state. That quan-
tum state evolves deterministically, with only an illusion
from the inside of probabilistic “branching.”
The trouble with all these interpretations as quick fixes to
Bell’s complaint is that they look to be just that, really
quick fixes. They look to be interpretive strategies hardly
compelled by the details of the quantum formalism. This
explains in part why we could exhibit three such different
strategies, but it is worse: Each of these strategies gives
rise to its own set of incredibilities—ones for which, if one
were endowed with Bell’s gift for the pen, one could make
look just as silly. Take the pilot-wave theories: They give
instantaneous action at a distance, but not actions that
can be harnessed to send detectable signals. If there were
no equations pretending a veneer of science, this would
have been called counting angels on the head of a pin.
QUANTUM STATES DO NOT EXIST
There is another lesson from the H1N1 virus. To some
perplexity, it seems people over 65—a population usually
more susceptible to fatalities with seasonal flu—fare better
than younger folk with H1N1. No one knows exactly why,
but the leading theory is that the older population, in
its years of other exposures, has developed various latent
antibodies. The antibodies are not perfect, but they are a
start. And so it may be for quantum foundations.
Here, the latent antibody is the concept of information,
and the perfected vaccine, we believe, will arise in part
from the theory of single-case, personal probabilities—the
branch of probability theory called Bayesianism. Sym-
bolically, the older population corresponds to some of
the founders of quantum theory (Heisenberg, Pauli, Ein-
stein) and some of the younger disciples of the Copenhagen
school (Rudolf Peierls, John Wheeler, Asher Peres), who,
though they disagreed on many details, were unified on
one point: That quantum states are not something out
there, in the external world, but instead are expressions of
information. Before there were people using quantum the-
ory as a branch of physics there were no quantum states.
The world may be full of stuff, composed of all kinds of
things, but among all the stuff and things, there is no
observer-independent, quantum-state kind of stuff.
The immediate payoff of this strategy is that it eliminates
the conundrums arising in the various objectified-state
interpretations. James Hartle [9] put the point decisively,
“The ‘reduction of the wave packet’ does take place in the
consciousness of the observer, not because of any unique
physical process which takes place there, but only because
the state is a construct of the observer and not an objective
property of the physical system.” The real substance of
Bell’s fear is just that, the fear itself. To succumb to it is
to block the way to understanding the theory. Moreover,
the shriller notes of Bell’s rhetoric are the least of the
worries: The universe didn’t have to wait billions of years
to collapse its first wave function—wave functions are not
part of the observer-independent world.
But this much of the solution is an elderly and some-
what ineffective antibody. Its presence is mostly a call
for more research. Luckily the days for this are ripe, and
it has much to do with the development of the field of
quantum information—that multidisciplinary field that in-
cludes quantum cryptography and quantum computation.
Terminology can say it all: A practitioner in that field
is just as likely to call any |ψ〉 “quantum information”
as “a quantum state.” “What does quantum teleporta-
tion do?” “It transfers quantum information from Alice
to Bob.” What we have here is a change of mindset [7].
What the protocols and theorems of quantum information
pound home is the idea that quantum states look and feel
like information in the technical sense of the word. There
is no more beautiful demonstration of this than Robert
Spekkens’s “toy model” mimicking various features of
quantum mechanics [10]. In this model, the “toys” are each
equipped with four possible mechanical configurations; but
the players, the manipulators of the toys, are consistently
impeded from having more than one bit of information
about each toy’s actual configuration (two bits about
two toys, etc.). The only things the players can know
are their states of uncertainty. The wonderful thing
is that these states of uncertainty exhibit many of the
characteristics of quantum information: from the no-
cloning theorem to analogues of quantum teleportation,
quantum key distribution, and even interference in a
Mach-Zehnder interferometer. More than two dozen
quantum phenomena are reproduced qualitatively, and all
the while one can pinpoint the cause: The phenomena arise
in the uncertainties, not in the mechanical configurations.
What considerations like this tell the objectifiers of quan-
tum states is that, far from being an appendage cheaply
tacked on to the theory, the idea of quantum states as in-
formation has a unifying power that goes a significant way
toward explaining why the theory has the mathematical
structure it does. There are, however, aspects of Bell’s
challenge that remain a worry. And upon these, all could
2 · Physics in Canada
Quantum Bayesianism at the Perimeter
still topple. Particularly, the questions Whose informa-
tion? and Information about what? must be addressed be-
fore any vaccine can be declared a success.
Good immunology does not come easily. But this much is
sure: The glaringly obvious (that a large part of quantum
theory is about information) should not be abandoned
rashly: To do so is to lose grip of the theory, with no
better grasp on reality in return. If on the other hand, one
holds fast to the central point about information, initially
frightening though it may be, one may still be able to
construct a picture of reality from the perimeter of vision.
QUANTUM BAYESIANISM
Every area of human endeavor has its bold extremes. Ones
that say, “If this is going to be done right, we must go
this far. Nothing less will do.” In probability theory, the
bold extreme is personalist Bayesianism [11]. It says that
probability theory is of the character of formal logic—a
set of criteria for testing consistency. The key similarity is
that formal logic does not have within it the power to set
the truth values of the propositions it manipulates. It can
only show whether various truth values are inconsistent;
the actual values come from another source. Whenever
logic reveals a set of truth values inconsistent, one must
return to their source to alleviate the discord. Precisely in
which way to alleviate it, though, logic gives no guidance.
The key idea of personalist Bayesian probability theory is
that it too is a calculus of consistency (or “coherence” as
the practitioners call it), but this time for one’s decision-
making degrees of belief. Probability theory can only
show whether various degrees of belief are inconsistent.
The actual beliefs come from another source, and there is
nowhere to pin their responsibility but on the agent who
holds them. A probability assignment is a tool an agent
uses to make gambles and decisions, but probability theory
as a whole is not about a single isolated belief—rather it
is about a whole mesh of them. When a belief in the mesh
is found to be incoherent with the others, the theory flags
the inconsistency. However, it gives no guidance for how
to mend any incoherences it finds. To alleviate discord,
one must return to the source of the assignments in the
first place—the very agent who is attempting to sum up
all his history and experience with those assignments.
Where personalist Bayesianism breaks from other devel-
opments of probability theory is that it says there are no
external criteria for declaring an isolated probability as-
signment right or wrong. The only basis for a judgment of
adequacy comes from the inside, from the greater mesh of
beliefs the agent accesses when appraising his coherence.
Similarly for quantum mechanics.
The defining feature of Quantum Bayesianism [2–7] is that
it says, “If this is going to be done right, we must go this
far.” Specifically, there can be no such thing as a right
and true quantum state, if such is thought of as defined
by criteria external to the agent making the assignment:
Quantum states must instead be like personalist Bayesian
probabilities. The connection between the two founda-
tional issues is this. Quantum states, through the Born
Rule, can be used to calculate probabilities. On the other
hand, if one assigns probabilities for the outcomes of a
well-selected set of measurements, then this is mathemat-
ically equivalent to making the quantum-state assignment
itself. Thus, if probabilities are personal in the Bayesian
sense, then so too must be quantum states.
What this buys interpretatively is that it gives each
quantum state a home. Indeed, a home localized in space
and time—namely, the physical site of the agent who
assigns it! By this method, one expels once and for all the
fear that quantum mechanics leads to “spooky action at a
distance,” and expels as well any hint of a problem with
“Wigner’s friend.” It does this because it removes the very
last trace of confusion over whether quantum states might
still be objective, agent-independent, physical properties.
The innovation of Quantum Bayesianism is that, for most
of the history of trying to take an informational point of
view about quantum states, the supporters of the idea have
tried to have it both ways: that on the one hand quantum
states are not real physical properties, yet on the other
there is a right quantum state after all. One hears things
like, “The right quantum state is the one the agent should
adopt if he had all the information.” The tension in this
statement, however, leaves its holder open to immediate
attack: “If there’s a right quantum state after all, then
why not just be done with all this squabbling and call it
a physical fact independent of the agent? And if it is a
physical fact, what recourse does one have for declaring
that there is no action at a distance when delocalized
quantum states change instantaneously?”
The Quantum Bayesian dispels these difficulties by being
conscientiously forthright. Whose information? “Mine!”
Information about what? “The consequences (for me) of
my actions upon the physical system!” The point of view
here is that a quantum measurement is nothing other than
Physics in Canada · 3
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Figure 1.
a well-placed kick upon a system—a kick that leads to
unpredictable consequences for the very agent who did
the kicking. What of quantum theory? It is a universal
single-user theory in much the same way that Bayesian
probability theory is. It is a users’ manual that any agent
can pick up and use to help make wise decisions in this
world of inherent uncertainty. In my case, a world in
which I am forced to be uncertain about the consequences
of my actions; in your case, a world in which you are
forced to be uncertain about the consequences of your
actions. In a quantum mechanics with the understanding
that each instance of its use is strictly single-user—“My
measurement outcomes happen right here, to me, and I
am talking about my uncertainty of them.”—there is no
room for most of the perennial quantum mysteries.
With this we finally pin down the way in which quantum
theory is “different in character from any physical theory
before.” For the Quantum Bayesian, quantum theory
is not something outside probability theory—it is not
a picture of the world as it is—but rather an addition
to probability theory itself. As probability theory is
a normative theory, not saying what one must believe,
but offering rules of consistency an agent should strive
to satisfy within his overall mesh of beliefs, so it is the
case with quantum theory. To embrace this is all the
vaccination quantum theory needs.
SEEKING SICS – THE BORN RULE AS
FUNDAMENTAL
Yet, if quantum theory is a user’s manual, one cannot
forget that the world is its author. And from its writing
style, one may still be able to tell something of the author
herself. The question is how to tease out the motif.
Something that cannot be said of the Quantum Bayesian
program is that it has not had to earn its keep in the larger
world of quantum interpretations. Since the beginning,
the promoters of the view have been on the run proving
technical theorems whenever required to close a gap in its
logic or negate an awkwardness in its new way of speaking.
A case in point is the quantum de Finetti theorem [4, 12].
This is a theorem that arose from contemplating the mean-
ing of one of the most common phrases of quantum infor-
mation science—the unknown quantum state. The term
is ubiquitous: Unknown quantum states are teleported,
protected with quantum error correcting codes, and much
more. From a Quantum-Bayesian point of view, however,
it can only be an oxymoron: If quantum states are states
of belief, and not states of nature, then the state is known
to someone, the agent who holds it. But if so, then what
on earth are experimentalists doing when they say they are
performing quantum-state tomography in the laboratory?
The quantum de Finneti theorem is a technical result
that allows the story of quantum-state tomography to
be told purely in terms of a single agent—namely, the
experimentalist in the laboratory. In a nutshell, the
theorem is this. Suppose the experimentalist walks into
the laboratory with the minimal belief that, of the systems
his device is spitting out, he could interchange any two of
them and it would not change the statistics he expects
for any measurements. Then the theorem says “coherence
alone” requires him to make a quantum state assignment
ρ(n) (for any n of those systems) representable in the form:
ρ(n) =
∫
P (ρ) ρ⊗ndρ , (1)
where P (ρ) dρ is some probability measure on the space of
single-system density operators and ρ⊗n = ρ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρ. To
put it in words, this theorem licenses the experimenter to
act as if each individual system has some state ρ unknown
to him, with a probability density P (ρ) representing his
ignorance of which state is the true one. But it is only as
if—the only real quantum state in the picture is the one
the experimenter actually possesses, namely ρ(n).
4 · Physics in Canada
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This example is one of several, and what they all show
is that the point of view has some technical crunch—it is
not stale, lifeless philosophy. Heartened with success, let
us push toward a deeper question: If quantum theory is so
closely allied with probability theory, why is it not written
in a language that starts with probability, rather than a
language that ends with it? Why does quantum theory
invoke the mathematical apparatus of Hilbert spaces and
linear operators, rather than probabilities outright? This
brings us to present-day research at Perimeter Institute.
The answer we seek hinges on a hypothetical structure
called a “symmetric informationally complete positive-
operator-valued measure,” or SIC for short. This is a set
of d2 rank-one projection operators Πi = |ψi〉〈ψi| on a
d-dimensional Hilbert space such that
∣∣〈ψi|ψj〉∣∣2 = 1
d+ 1
whenever i 6= j . (2)
Because of their extreme symmetry, it turns out that
such sets of operators, when they exist, have remarkable
properties. Among these, two powerful ones are that
they must be linearly independent (spanning the space of
Hermitian operators) and sum to d times the identity.
This is significant because it implies that an arbitrary
state ρ can be expressed as a linear combination of the
Πi. Moreover, because the operators Hi =
1
d
Πi are
positive-semidefinite and sum to the identity, these can
be interpreted as labeling the outcomes of a quantum
measurement device—not a von Neumann measurement
device, but a measurement device of the most general
kind allowed in quantum theory [13]. Finally, the Πi’s
symmetry gives a simple relation between the probabilities
P (Hi) = tr
(
ρHi
)
and the expansion coefficients for ρ:
ρ =
d2∑
i=1
(
(d+ 1)P (Hi)−
1
d
)
Πi . (3)
The extreme simplicity of this formula suggests it is the
best place for the Quantum Bayesian to seek his motif.
Before proceeding, we must reveal what is so consternating
about the SICs: It is whether they exist at all. Despite 10
years of growing effort since the definition was introduced
[14, 15], no one has been able to show that they exist in
general dimension. All that is known firmly is that they
exist in dimensions 2 through 67: dimensions 2 – 15, 19, 24,
35, and 48 by analytic proof, and the remainder through
Figure 2.
numerical simulation [16]. How much evidence is this that
SICs exist? The reader must answer this for himself, but
for the remainder of the article we will proceed as if they
do for all finite dimensions d and see where it leads.
Thinking of a quantum state as literally an agent’s proba-
bility assignment for the outcomes of a potential SIC mea-
surement leads to a new way of expressing the Born Rule
for all quantum probabilities. Consider the diagram in
Figure 2. It depicts a SIC measurement “in the sky,” with
outcomes Hi, and an arbitrary von Neumann measure-
ment “on the ground,” with outcomes Dj = |j〉〈j|, for
some orthonormal basis. We conceive of two possibilities
(or two “paths”) for a given quantum system to get to the
measurement on the ground: “Path 1” is that it proceeds
directly to the measurement. “Path 2” is that it proceeds
first to the measurement in the sky and only subsequently
cascades to the measurement on the ground.
Suppose now, we are given the agent’s personal proba-
bilities P (Hi) for the outcomes in the sky and his con-
ditional probabilities P (Dj |Hi) for the outcomes on the
ground subsequent to the sky. I.e., we are given what
the agent would assign on the supposition that the system
follows Path 2. Then “coherence alone” (in the Bayesian
sense) is enough to tell what probabilities P (Dj) the agent
Physics in Canada · 5
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should assign for the outcomes of the measurement on the
ground—it is given by the Law of Total Probability:
P (Dj) =
∑
i
P (Hi)P (Dj |Hi) . (4)
That takes care of Path 2, but what of Path 1? Is this
enough to recover the probability Q(Dj) the agent would
assign for the outcomes of Path 1 by the Born Rule?
That is, that Q(Dj) = tr(ρDj) for some quantum state
ρ? Clearly Q(Dj) 6= P (Dj), for Path 2 is not a coherent
process (in the quantum sense!) with respect to Path 1.
What is remarkable about the SIC representation is that
it implies that, though Q(Dj) is not equal to P (Dj), it is
nonetheless a function of it. Particularly,
Q(Dj) = (d+ 1)
d2∑
i=1
P (Hi)P (Dj |Hi)− 1 . (5)
The Born Rule is nothing but a kind of Quantum Law of
Total Probability! No complex amplitudes, no operators—
only probabilities in, and probabilities out.
Nonetheless, Eq. (5) does not invalidate probability the-
ory: For the old Law of Total Probability has no juris-
diction in the setting of our diagram, which compares
a “factual” experiment (Path 1) to a “counterfactual”
one (Path 2). Indeed as any Bayesian would emphasize,
if there is a distinguishing mark in one’s considerations,
then one ought to take that into account in one’s prob-
ability assignments. Thus there is a suppressed condi-
tion in our notation: Really we should have been writ-
ing the more cumbersome P (Hi|E2), P (Dj |Hi, E2), and
Q(Dj|E1) all along. With this explicit, it is no surprise
that Q(Dj |E1) 6= P (Dj|E2). The message is that quan-
tum theory supplies something that raw probability the-
ory does not. The Born Rule in these lights is an addition
to Bayesian probability in the sense of giving an extra
normative rule to guide the agent’s behavior whenever he
interacts with the physical world.
THE FUTURE
A vaccination of Quantum Bayesianism makes a healthy
body even healthier, but it is far from the last word on
quantum theory. In fact it is just an indication of the great
adventure that lies ahead. By rewriting the Born Rule as
Eq. (5) one gets a sense of where the essence of quantum
theory has been hiding all along. It is in the active power
of this quantity called dimension [1]. When an agent
interacts with a quantum system, its dimension determines
the extent to which the agent should deviate from the Law
of Total Probability when transforming his counterfactual
probability calculations to factual ones. That “power”
calls out for an independent characterization that makes
no necessary reference to the agent using it. Can it be
done? And if it can be done, what are its implications
for physics as whole, from common laboratory issues to
open questions in gravity and cosmology? The Quantum
Bayesians at Perimeter Institute are trying their best to
find out.
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